Up-or-Out Rules in the Market for Lawyers.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 1995
Volume: 13
Issue: 4
Pages: 709-35

Authors (2)

O'Flaherty, Brendan (not in RePEc) Siow, Aloysius (University of Toronto)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The authors examine how up-or-out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers. Using data on large New York law firms, they show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high. A newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise. Firm growth therefore contributes between 5-7 percent of the present value of profits of a law firm. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:13:y:1995:i:4:p:709-35
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29