A Rehabilitation of the Principle of Insufficient Reason

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1980
Volume: 94
Issue: 3
Pages: 493-506

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

It is shown that two of the axioms necessary for the expected utility rule imply the Principle of Insufficient Reason. Whenever a decision maker knows the possible states of the world, but completely lacks information about the plausibility of each single state, he has to behave as if all states occurred with the same objective probability, known with certainty. The result is applied to decision trees and used to solve a problem formulated by Savage in order to discredit the classical version of the Principle of Insufficient Reason.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:94:y:1980:i:3:p:493-506.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29