Local interaction in tax evasion

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 3
Pages: 412-415

Authors (3)

Garay, Barnabás M. (not in RePEc) Simonovits, András (Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tud...) Tóth, János (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:412-415
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29