Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 123
Issue: 1
Pages: 81-107

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities—the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)—that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008–2009. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and, in the case of the TSLF, at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:123:y:2017:i:1:p:81-107
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24