On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: Type of externality and timing of policymaking

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 2
Pages: 213-216

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We demonstrate that global permit markets are Pareto efficient despite the externality type, production or consumption, when income redistribution occurs after regional environmental policymaking. Ex-ante income redistribution is neutral if emissions affect production only, but non-neutral if emissions affect consumption.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:213-216
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29