Do real estate agents have information advantages in housing markets?

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 134
Issue: 3
Pages: 715-735

Authors (4)

Agarwal, Sumit (not in RePEc) He, Jia (not in RePEc) Sing, Tien Foo (National University of Singapo...) Song, Changcheng (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use a large housing transaction data set in Singapore to study whether real estate agents use information advantages to buy houses at bargain prices. Agents bought their own houses at prices that are 2.54% lower than comparable houses bought by other buyers. Consistent with information asymmetries, agent buyers have more information advantages in less informative environments, and agent buyers are more likely to buy houses from agent sellers. Agent discounts are from both “cherry picking” and bargaining power, and bargaining power contributes more to the agent discounts. Agents’ advantage consists in their information of available houses and previous purchase prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:134:y:2019:i:3:p:715-735
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29