Optimal tolerance for failure

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 109
Issue: C
Pages: 41-55

Authors (2)

Siegert, Caspar (Bank of England) Trepper, Piers (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider the problem of an employer who has to choose whether to reemploy agents with a positive track record or agents who were unsuccessful. While previously successful managers are likely to be of high ability, they have also accumulated wealth and will be harder to motivate in the future. It may hence be optimal to retain unsuccessful managers but not successful ones. The result that the optimal tenure of a manager may not be increasing in his success is consistent with empirical studies that find a low correlation between firm success and managerial turnover.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:109:y:2015:i:c:p:41-55
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29