Dynamic R&D with spillovers: A comment

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2016
Volume: 73
Issue: C
Pages: 453-457

Authors (2)

Smrkolj, Grega (Newcastle University) Wagener, Florian (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:73:y:2016:i:c:p:453-457
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29