Supermarket Choice and Supermarket Competition in Market Equilibrium

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2004
Volume: 71
Issue: 1
Pages: 235-263

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Multi-store firms are common in the retailing industry. Theory suggests that cross-elasticities between stores of the same firm enhance market power. To evaluate the importance of this effect in the U.K. supermarket industry, we estimate a model of consumer choice and expenditure using three data sources: profit margins for each chain, a survey of consumer choices and a data-set of store characteristics. To permit plausible substitution patterns, the utility model interacts consumer and store characteristics. We measure market power by calculating the effect of merger and demerger on Nash equilibrium prices. Demerger reduces the prices of the largest firms by between 2 and 3.8% depending on local concentration; mergers between the largest firms lead to price increases up to 7.4%. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:1:p:235-263
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29