Determinants of Contract Choice: The Use of Warrants to Compensate Underwriters of Seasoned Equity Issues.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 1996
Volume: 51
Issue: 1
Pages: 363-80

Authors (2)

Ng, Chee K (not in RePEc) Smith, Richard L (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two-stage logit model to correct for self-selection bias, the authors find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:51:y:1996:i:1:p:363-80
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29