COUNTERVAILING POWER IN WHOLESALE PHARMACEUTICALS*

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 58
Issue: 1
Pages: 32-53

Authors (2)

SARA FISHER ELLISON (not in RePEc) CHRISTOPHER M. SNYDER (Dartmouth College)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using data on wholesale prices for antibiotics sold to U.S. drugstores, we test the growing theoretical literature on ‘countervailing power’ (a term for the ability of large buyers to extract discounts from suppliers). Large drugstores receive a modest discount for antibiotics produced by competing suppliers but no discount for antibiotics produced by monopolists. These findings support theories suggesting that supplier competition is a prerequisite for countervailing power. As further evidence for the importance of supplier competition, we find that hospitals receive substantial discounts relative to drugstores, attributed to hospitals' greater ability to induce supplier competition through restrictive formularies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:1:p:32-53
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29