Bargaining, Compensating Wage Differentials, and Dualism of the Labor Market: Theory and Evidence for France.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 1998
Volume: 16
Issue: 3
Pages: 546-75

Authors (2)

Daniel, Christophe (not in RePEc) Sofer, Catherine (Paris School of Economics)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The theory of compensating differentials predicts a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions, while the theory of segmentation predicts a positive one. Combining the hedonic wage model and the wages-employment collective bargaining model, the authors show the relevance of a further factor: a union power effect. Then they test the validity of this effect with French cross-section data. Empirical results confirm the predictions of the model, that is, the coexistence of a negative relationship between wages and good working conditions for the whole sample (market effect) and a positive relationship in highly unionized sectors (union power effect). Copyright 1998 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:16:y:1998:i:3:p:546-75
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29