Disadvantaging Rivals: Vertical Integration in the Pharmaceutical Market

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2026
Volume: 18
Issue: 1
Pages: 286-304

Authors (3)

Charles Gray (not in RePEc) Abby Alpert (not in RePEc) Neeraj Sood (University of Southern Califor...)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The pharmaceutical market has experienced a wave of vertical integration between pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and insurers in recent years. Using a unique dataset on insurer-PBM contracts, we document increasing vertical integration in Medicare Part D. Next, we evaluate the effects of a large insurer-PBM merger in 2015, assessing the trade-offs of vertical integration—harms to competition on the one hand and improved efficiency on the other. We find premium increases for rival insurers post-merger, consistent with vertically integrated PBMs raising costs through input foreclosure. We find no evidence of benefits to consumers of the merged firm from lower premiums.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:18:y:2026:i:1:p:286-304
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29