Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 102
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A coalitional ranking describes a situation where a finite set of agents can form coalitions that are ranked according to a weak order. A social ranking solution on a domain of coalitional rankings assigns a social ranking, that is a weak order over the agent set, to each coalitional ranking of this domain. We introduce two lexicographic solutions for a variable population domain of coalitional rankings. These solutions are computed from the individual performance of the agents, then, when this performance criterion does not allow to decide between two agents, a collective performance criterion is applied to the coalitions of higher size. We provide parallel axiomatic characterizations of these two solutions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000726
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24