Youth Gangs as Pseudo‐Governments: Implications for Violent Crime

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2009
Volume: 75
Issue: 4
Pages: 996-1018

Authors (2)

Russell S. Sobel (The Citadel) Brian J. Osoba (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We hypothesize that the failure of government to protect the rights of individuals from violence committed by youths has led to the formation of youth gangs as protective agencies. Our theory predicts an opposite direction of causality between gang activity and violent crime from what is widely accepted. While areas with more gang activity also have more violence, our results suggest that gangs form as protection agencies precisely in areas with high violent crime rates. While gangs, like governments, use violence to enforce rules, the net impact of gangs is likely to lower violent crime. We test this hypothesis and offer policy implications.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:75:y:2009:i:4:p:996-1018
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29