Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 1990
Volume: 33
Issue: 1
Pages: 65-101

Authors (1)

Spiller, Pablo T (University of California-Berke...)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:v:33:y:1990:i:1:p:65-101
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29