A Model of Competing Narratives

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 110
Issue: 12
Pages: 3786-3816

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives." Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that people are drawn to hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain, and their contribution to political polarization.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:12:p:3786-3816
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29