Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2022
Volume: 138
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Imperfect information aggregation in secondary markets of credit has significant consequences for economic cycles. As banks put more weight on mark-to-market gains, they find it optimal to refrain from revealing information about adverse shocks. Consequently, default risk is mispriced, and loan volumes, and thus investment, are not appropriately reduced. Overinvesment lowers the price of capital, leading households to increase consumption without decreasing labour supply, generating a boom. Due to mispricing, banks subsequently face bigger losses and capital depletion. Output then decreases sharply due to credit supply shortages. These instances of market dysfunction are crucial in amplifying credit cycles.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:138:y:2022:i:c:s0165188922000665
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24