A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2015
Volume: 28
Issue: 9
Pages: 2534-2574

Authors (2)

Viral V. Acharya (New York University (NYU)) Bart M. Lambrecht (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage future expectations downward. The observed income and payout process are smooth and adjust partially and over time in response to economic shocks. The smaller the inside ownership, the more severe underproduction is, resulting in an "outside equity Laffer curve."

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:28:y:2015:i:9:p:2534-2574.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24