Dominance and admissibility without priors

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 116
Issue: 1
Pages: 118-120

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note axiomatizes the incomplete preference ordering that reflects statewise dominance with respect to expected utility, as well as the according choice correspondence. The main motivation is to clarify how admissibility as understood by statisticians relates to existing axiomatizations. The answer is that it is characterized by Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) axioms, plus symmetry (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972), less completeness. Characterizing the according choice correspondence requires relaxing the weak axiom of revealed preference.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:118-120
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29