Choice theory when agents can randomize

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 155
Issue: C
Pages: 131-151

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper takes choice theory to risk or uncertainty. Well-known decision models are axiomatized under the premise that agents can randomize. Under a reversal of order assumption, this convexifies choice sets, and even after imposing the weak axiom of revealed preference and nonemptiness of choice correspondences, the preferences directly revealed by choice may be incomplete or cyclical.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:131-151
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29