Why Did Holdings of Highly Rated Securitization Tranches Differ So Much across Banks?

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2014
Volume: 27
Issue: 2
Pages: 404-453

Authors (3)

Isil Erel (not in RePEc) Taylor Nadauld (not in RePEc) René M. Stulz (Ohio State University)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide estimates of holdings of highly rated securitization tranches of U.S. bank holding companies before the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain them. Whereas holdings exceeded Tier 1 capital for some large banks, they were economically trivial for the typical bank. Banks with high holdings were not riskier before the crisis using conventional measures, but they performed poorly during the crisis. We find that holdings of highly rated tranches were correlated with a bank's securitization activity. Theories unrelated to the securitization activity, such as "bad incentives" or "bad risk management," are not supported in the data.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:2:p:404-453.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29