Coarse Competitive Equilibrium and Extreme Prices

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 1
Pages: 109-37

Authors (3)

Faruk Gul (not in RePEc) Wolfgang Pesendorfer (not in RePEc) Tomasz Strzalecki (Harvard University)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce a notion of coarse competitive equilibrium, to study agents' inability to tailor their consumption to prices. Our goal is to incorporate limited cognitive ability (in particular limited attention, memory, and complexity) into the analysis of competitive equilibrium. Compared to standard competitive equilibrium, our concept yields more extreme prices and, when all agents have the same endowment, riskier allocations. We provide a tractable model suitable for general equilibrium analysis as well as asset pricing.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:1:p:109-37
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29