Identification of payoffs in repeated games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2016
Volume: 99
Issue: C
Pages: 82-88

Authors (2)

Lee, Byung Soo (not in RePEc) Stewart, Colin (University of Toronto)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In one-shot games, an analyst who knows the best response correspondence can only make limited inferences about the players' payoffs. In repeated games with full monitoring, this is not true: we show that, under a weak condition, if the game is repeated sufficiently many times and players are sufficiently patient, the best response correspondence completely determines the payoffs (up to positive affine transformations).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:82-88
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29