Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislation

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the possibility for a regulator to reduce policy costs by substituting a voluntary policy based on a legislative threat to an active harvest control. Specifically, we focus on fisheries where the regulator aims to maintain an optimal level of conservation through a voluntary agreement. To achieve this, we identify a mandatory regulation that can serve as a threat to ensure voluntary compliance and avoid regulation costs. However, threats differ from effective policies. To be enforceable, they must be validated through a legislative process, the outcome of which is uncertain and subject to objections. Consequently, we introduce a random delay in its application and address social acceptability issues. This threat rests upon two pillars: a moratorium with financial compensation followed by an Individual Transferable Quota mechanism and a suitably chosen tax on harvesting capacity to deter deviations. We use data from the scallop fishery in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (France) to illustrate this voluntary mechanism.