Job Displacement, Disability, and Divorce

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 22
Issue: 2
Pages: 489-522

Authors (2)

Kerwin Kofi Charles (not in RePEc) Melvin Stephens (University of Michigan)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Earnings shocks should affect divorce probability by changing a couple's expected gains from marriage. We find that the divorce hazard rises after a spouse's job displacement but does not change after a spousal disability. This difference casts doubt on a purely pecuniary motivation for divorce following earnings shocks, since both types of shocks exhibit similar long-run economic consequences. Furthermore, the increase in divorce is found only for layoffs and not for plant closings, suggesting that information conveyed about a partner's noneconomic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more important than financial losses in precipitating divorce.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:22:y:2004:i:2:p:489-522
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29