Individual expectations, limited rationality and aggregate outcomes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Year: 2012
Volume: 36
Issue: 8
Pages: 1101-1120

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Recent studies suggest that the type of strategic environment or expectation feedback can have a large impact on whether the market can learn the rational fundamental price. We present an experiment where the fundamental price experiences large unexpected shocks. Markets with negative expectation feedback (strategic substitutes) quickly converge to the new fundamental, while markets with positive expectation feedback (strategic complements) do not converge, but show underreaction in the short run and overreaction in the long run. A simple evolutionary selection model of individual learning explains these differences in aggregate outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:8:p:1101-1120
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24