The political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2017
Volume: 171
Issue: 1
Pages: 207-221

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract I analyze the choice politicians face when seeking votes from groups that lobby for sales tax rate decreases or tax exemptions, given the constraint that politicians want to raise a certain amount of revenue. Using data on sales taxes, I develop a model predicting a positive relationship between the number of exemptions and the sales tax rate. The estimation results provide support for this prediction. Each additional exemption is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points in the tax rate.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:171:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0434-z
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29