From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 17
Issue: 2
Pages: 304-313

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper reports results of a natural field experiment on the dictator game where subjects are unaware that they are participating in an experiment. Three other experiments explore, step by step, how laboratory behavior of students relates to field behavior of a general population. In all experiments, subjects display an equally high amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students or not, participate in a laboratory or not, or are aware of their participating in an experiment or not. This paper shows that there are settings where laboratory behavior of students is predictive for field behavior of a general population. Copyright Economic Science Association 2014

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:304-313
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29