On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2022
Volume: 135
Issue: C
Pages: 74-78

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In Smirnov and Wait (2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games. This note shows by simple examples that the identification is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient. The main issue is that the method does not fully reflect the requirements of subgame perfection, so there is a conceptual and not just a technical problem.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:74-78
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29