Tax Evasion and Capital Taxation

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2024
Volume: 132
Issue: 7
Pages: 2488 - 2529

Authors (2)

Shahar Rotberg (not in RePEc) Joseph B. Steinberg (University of Toronto)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Wealth inequality has prompted calls for higher taxes on capital income and wealth but also concerns that rich households would respond by concealing their assets offshore. We use a general equilibrium model to study how taxing capital more heavily would affect offshore tax evasion and how this would affect the broader economy. Without evasion, tax revenue could be increased dramatically, inequality could be reduced, and widespread welfare gains could be achieved. After accounting for evasion, however, tax revenue would rise marginally or even fall, inequality would increase, and widespread welfare losses would result.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729066
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29