DOES PUBLIC ATTENTION REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF MONEYED INTERESTS? POLICY POSITIONS ON SOPA/PIPA BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTERNET BLACKOUT

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2019
Volume: 57
Issue: 4
Pages: 1879-1895

Authors (2)

Ulrich Matter (not in RePEc) Alois Stutzer (Universität Basel)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate the role of public attention in determining the effect that campaign contributions by interest groups have on legislators' policy positions. We exploit the shock in public attention induced by the Internet service blackout of January 2012 that increased the salience of the Stop Online Piracy Act/Protect IP Act (SOPA/PIPA) bills aimed at stronger protection of property rights on the Internet. Using a new dataset of U.S. congressmen's public statements, we find a strong statistical relationship between campaign contributions funded by the affected industries and legislators' positions. However, this relationship evaporates once the two bills become primary policy issues. Our results are consistent with the notion that legislators choose positions on secondary policy issues in order to cater to organized interests, whereas positions on primary policy issues are driven by electoral support. (JEL D72, L82, L86)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:4:p:1879-1895
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29