Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? -- Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2004
Volume: 119
Issue: 1_2
Pages: 31-59

Authors (2)

Matthias Benz (not in RePEc) Alois Stutzer (Universität Basel)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:119:y:2004:i:1_2:p:31-59
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29