Closed Shops and Relative Pay: Institutional Arrangements or High Density?

B-Tier
Journal: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Year: 1992
Volume: 54
Issue: 4
Pages: 503-16

Authors (2)

Metcalf, David (not in RePEc) Stewart, Mark (University of Warwick)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Employees in workplaces with a closed shop get paid more than their counterparts in comparable workplaces without a closed shop. Is this pay differential a consequence of high union density or the institution of the closed ship itself? The authors' results indicate that a post-entry closed shop adds no extra pay differential over and above that achieved by employees in workplaces with high union density but no closed shop. By contrast the preentry closed shop--where the union normally controls the labor supply and has the potential to impose substantial costs on the employer by striking--roughly doubles the premium gained by high density alone. The implications of their results for the likely impact on union wage premia of recent legal changes outlawing the closed shop are discussed. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:obuest:v:54:y:1992:i:4:p:503-16
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29