Optimal stopping with private information

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 159
Issue: PB
Pages: 702-727

Authors (2)

Kruse, Thomas (not in RePEc) Strack, Philipp (Yale University)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems. Examples include job search, timing of market entry decisions, irreversible investment or the pricing of American options. This paper analyzes optimal stopping as a mechanism design problem with transfers. We show that under a dynamic single crossing condition a stopping rule can be implemented by a transfer that only depends on the realized stopping decision if and only if it is a cut-off rule. We characterize the transfer implementing a given stopping rule using a novel technique based on constrained stochastic processes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pb:p:702-727
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29