Rational Groupthink*

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2021
Volume: 136
Issue: 1
Pages: 621-668

Authors (4)

Matan Harel (not in RePEc) Elchanan Mossel (not in RePEc) Philipp Strack (Yale University) Omer Tamuz (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others’ actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others’ private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink—in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time—as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:136:y:2021:i:1:p:621-668.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29