How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2017
Volume: 9
Issue: 2
Pages: 149-87

Authors (2)

Robert W. Staiger (Dartmouth College) Alan O. Sykes (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The "non-violation" clause of GATT is Exhibit A for the proposition that international trade agreements are incomplete contracts. According to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, it underpins the success of the GATT/WTO's "shallow integration" approach. Yet the observed role of the non-violation complaint is minimal. We develop a model of non-violation claims in trade agreements, demonstrate that it predicts a minimal on-equilibrium-path role for non-violation claims under reasonable parameter restrictions, and show that the non-violation clause may nevertheless play an important off-equilibrium-path role in the GATT/WTO.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:149-87
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29