Rating rules in the helping game: An axiomatic approach

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 254
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Marietta Leina, Andrea (not in RePEc) Patel, Amrish (not in RePEc) Sugden, Robert (University of East Anglia) Turocy, Theodore L. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine a stylised helping game in which players recurrently decide whether to help others at personal cost and are assigned binary ratings of “helpfulness” based on previous choices. We propose axioms requiring that ratings are responsive to players’ decisions and change monotonically with respect to helping given or withheld. Only four rules satisfy these axioms: two standing rules and two versions of a form of binary image scoring. These results show how a single rating can encode both the “desert” perspective, linking worthiness to kindness and deservingness, and the “club” perspective, relating worthiness to a cooperative club’s membership.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525002745
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29