Self-consistency for multi-valued solutions and reasonable outcomes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 120
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Calleja, Pedro (not in RePEc) Llerena, Francesc (not in RePEc) Sudhölter, Peter

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We explore the compatibility of uniform self-consistency and ordinary self-consistency, two extensions for handling multi-valued solutions within the consistency principle introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), with basic properties, such as reasonableness, which establishes bounds for payoffs based on the marginality principle. Our analysis focuses on convex games and balanced games through the study of almost positive games, a subset of convex games that plays a crucial role in the vector lattice structure of games. Further, we provide new axiomatic foundations of the core incorporating these consistency properties.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:120:y:2025:i:c:s0304406825000886
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29