Economics at the FCC, 2016–2017: Auction Designs for Spectrum Repurposing and Universal Service Subsidies

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 51
Issue: 4
Pages: 451-486

Authors (5)

Evan Kwerel (not in RePEc) Paroma Sanyal (not in RePEc) Katja Seim (not in RePEc) Martha Stancill (not in RePEc) Patrick Sun (Government of the United State...)

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:51:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9597-5
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-29