Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2012
Volume: 78
Issue: 4
Pages: 1142-1162

Authors (4)

Charles A. Holt (University of Virginia) Cathleen A. Johnson (not in RePEc) Courtney A. Mallow (not in RePEc) Sean P. Sullivan (University of Iowa, College of...)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Laboratory experiments are used to investigate alternative solutions to the allocation problem of a common‐pool resource with unidirectional flow. Focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of nonbinding communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, allocation by auction, and allocation by exogenous usage fee. All solutions improve allocative efficiency, but communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed optimal fee results in the greatest allocative efficiency, closely followed by an auction allocation that determines the usage fee endogenously.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2012:i:4:p:1142-1162
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29