Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes

B-Tier
Journal: Labour Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 52
Issue: C
Pages: 27-39

Authors (3)

Andersen, Torben M. (not in RePEc) Kristoffersen, Mark Strøm (not in RePEc) Svarer, Michael (Aarhus Universitet)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The past employment history – employment requirements – is part of the eligibility conditions for unemployment insurance in most western countries. In a standard search-matching model, we show how employment requirements strengthen the reentitlement effect and thereby changes the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of the optimal insurance scheme. Deploying employment requirements for benefit eligibility may thus allow for both higher benefit levels and longer duration, and yet labor market performance is improved. When the need for insurance increases due to higher risk aversion, employment requirements becomes less lenient, and oppositely when the environment becomes more risky.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:labeco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:27-39
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29