Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2015
Volume: 7
Issue: 4
Pages: 109-49

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine centralized versus decentralized decision making when experience of agents is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has reputational concerns and his market may or may not observe what the other agent chooses (global versus local markets). With decentralized decision making, agents' willingness to communicate depends heavily on what a market observes. Strikingly, less communication may improve welfare. If markets are global, centralization outperforms decentralization as it makes communication possible, and communication is informative for any finite degree of conflict among agents and with the center. (JEL D60, D82, D83)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:109-49
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29