How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 123
Issue: 4
Pages: 1611-1633

Authors (2)

Austan Goolsbee (not in RePEc) Chad Syverson (University of Chicago)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine how incumbents respond to the threat of entry by competitors (as distinct from how they respond to actual entry). We look specifically at passenger airlines, using the evolution of Southwest Airlines' route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly. We find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest's entry. Over half of Southwest's total impact on incumbent fares occurs before Southwest starts flying. These cuts are only on threatened routes, not those out of non-Southwest competing airports. The evidence on whether incumbents are seeking to deter or accommodate entry is mixed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:123:y:2008:i:4:p:1611-1633.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29