More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2025
Volume: 174
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Neoclassical theory presumes that agents value instrumental information. In contrast, recent behavioral studies motivate and model information avoidance. We study preferences for and against instrumental information in a real-effort task varying information structures on performance pay. Our study offers three main results. First, we confirm that both, preferences for and against instrumental information, exist. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, our findings about information avoiders can be aligned with behavioral theories of optimistic belief design.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:174:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125000157
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29