Network competition with income effects

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 45
Issue: 3
Pages: 645-673

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <p>I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand. Empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant. Income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates: unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect. This also holds when operators discriminate between on-net and off-net calls if networks are differentiated. Operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second-degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on-net/off-net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:3:p:645-673
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29