Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 589-591

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:589-591
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29