Competition or Compensation: Supplier Incentives under the American and Japanese Subcontracting Systems.

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1997
Volume: 87
Issue: 4
Pages: 598-618

Authors (2)

Taylor, Curtis R (Duke University) Wiggins, Steven N (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Two fundamentally different subcontracting systems arise as distinct solutions to the quality control problem facing an input buyer. The 'American' system involves competitive bidding on each contract, large orders, and inspections. The 'Japanese' system involves repeat purchases from a supplier who earns a premium, small orders, and no inspections. Both systems may coexist as local solutions, but the global optimum is determined by the ratio of set-up to inspection costs. This suggests that the adoption of flexible manufacturing equipment and rising product complexity may be responsible for the shift from the American to the Japanese system observed in many industries. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:87:y:1997:i:4:p:598-618
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29