Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 118
Issue: C
Pages: 219-240

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is informed of both memes, and a loss of information. We show how the likelihood of segregation depends on information preferences and on parameters of the diffusion process.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:219-240
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29