Political Economy of Taxation in an Overlapping-Generations Economy

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Dynamics
Year: 2008
Volume: 11
Issue: 1
Pages: 18-43

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of intergenerational conflict on capital and labor income tax rates, transfers, and government spending in a model of multidimensional policy choice. The different nature of tax liabilities for the young and the old can explain why the old receive large gross lump-sum transfers through social security, while the young receive little or none. A natural link also emerges between the size of the government as a provider of public goods and the magnitude of transfers that the same government will implement. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:red:issued:06-188
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24